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Abstract
Adversarial training (AT) has become a popular choice for training robust networks.
However, it tends to sacrifice clean accuracy heavily in favor of robustness, and with
a large perturbation, it can cause models to learn a trivial solution, always predicting
the same class. To address the above concerns, we propose Adversarial Training
with Early Stopping (ATES), guided by principles from curriculum learning that
emphasizes on starting “easy” and gradually ramping up on the “difficulty” of
training. ATES is derived from our formulation for curriculum learning in the
adversarial setting which introduces an additional curriculum constraint to the
normal adversarial loss. To satisfy this constraint, we apply early stopping on the
adversarial example generation step when a specified level of difficulty is reached.
ATES stabilizes network training even for a large perturbation norm and allows
the network to operate at a better clean accuracy versus robustness trade-off curve
compared to AT. This leads to a significant improvement in both clean accuracy
and robustness compared to AT, TRADES, and the other baselines.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that machine learning models are easily fooled by crafted inputs, called adversarial
examples, generated by adding tiny perturbation to normal input samples [Biggio et al., 2013, Szegedy
et al., 2013, Goodfellow et al., 2015]. This raises serious safety concerns on systems that rely on
machine learning as crucial components (e.g. identity verification, malware detection, self-driving
vehicles). Among numerous defenses proposed, Adversarial Training (AT) [Madry et al., 2017] is one
of the most widely used algorithm to train neural networks that are robust to adversarial examples.
While serving as a strong baseline defense, AT suffers from two innate problems. First, it tends
to sacrifice accuracy on benign samples by a large margin to gain the robustness or accuracy on
adversarial examples. This is undesirable in practice because while adversarial examples can lead to
more adverse outcomes than benign misclassification, they are rare. Second, when training models
with a large perturbation, we found that they often learn a constant function predicting the same class
regardless of the inputs. For instance, AT on MNIST with `∞-perturbation norm over 0.3 results in
this trivial solution which may lead us to believe that we are reaching the fundamental limit of the
dataset and/or the hypothesis space. However, with our approach, we show that it is possible to train
the same network to have over 80% robust accuracy at perturbation norm of 0.45.
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 2
We posit that both problems stem from the model being presented with adversarial examples that
are “too difficult to learn from” at the very beginning of the training process. This causes the model
to overcompensate by either (1) behaving like a constant function so that samples from at least one
class are correctly classified; or (2) by over-prioritizing the perturbed samples and hence sacrificing
on clean accuracy. We observe that the concept of curriculum learning [Bengio et al., 2009], which
suggests that a model should learn from the “easy” samples first before being introduced to the “hard”
ones, naturally addresses these issues. However, one of the main criticisms of curriculum learning
is that the notion of “difficulty” of samples is not well-defined and hard to measure. Luckily, in the
AT framework, there exists a set of parameters which can be readily used as a difficulty metric. In
fact, prior works have considered a few options including the number of PGD steps [Cai et al., 2018],
perturbation norm [Balaji et al., 2019, Cheng et al., 2020] and convergence scores [Wang et al., 2019].
Here we unify the prior works under a single formulation for curriculum learning in the adversarial
setting and propose a new but intuitive difficulty metric. This metric, called softmax probability gap,
is directly motivated by the confidence score and the loss incurred by a given input sample. According
to this score, easy samples are ones that the network predicts correctly with high confidence and
conversely, hard samples are predicted with low confidence.
With this formulation, we propose a new robust training algorithm, Adversarial Training with Early
Stopping (ATES), which empirically improves both clean and adversarial accuracy compared to the
original AT. Additionally, our approach stabilizes the early stages of training, hence avoiding the
trivial solutions. On standard image datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10/100), our scheme also outperforms
state-of-the-art defenses including TRADES [Zhang et al., 2019] and the other curriculum-inspired
algorithms [Cai et al., 2018, Wang et al., 2019, Cheng et al., 2020] in term of robustness while
maintaining competitive clean accuracy.
2 Background and Related Work
Adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are a type of evasion attack against machine learning
models generated by adding small perturbations to clean samples [Szegedy et al., 2013, Goodfellow
et al., 2015]. The desired perturbation, constrained to be within some `p-norm ball around the clean
sample, is typically formulated as a solution to the following optimization problem:
xadv = x+ δ∗ where δ∗ = arg max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
L(x+ δ) (1)
where L : Rd → R is the loss function used by the target neural network. The perturbation is bounded
in an `p-norm ball of radius  and treated as a proxy for imperceptibility of the perturbation. Projected
gradient descent (PGD) [Madry et al., 2017] is a popular technique used to solve Eqn. (1).
Defenses against adversarial examples. In a nutshell, the adversarial training (AT) algorithm,
iteratively generates adversarial examples from every batch of the training data by solving Eqn. (1)
and then trains a model by minimizing the expected loss over the samples. AT is formulated as an
optimization of the saddle point problem as follows:
arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ladv(xi; θ) where Ladv(x; θ) := max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
L(x+ δ; θ) (2)
where θ are the model parameters, and {(xi, yi)}ni=1 denotes the training set. The inner maximization
is typically solved using PGD, and the outer minimization can be solved by mini batch SGD or by
any other technique used for training deep neural networks.
Several prior works have attempted to improve AT in terms of computation time [Shafahi et al., 2019,
Wong et al., 2020] and robustness gain [Zhang et al., 2019, Ding et al., 2020, Wang et al., 2020].
Many works have tried different loss functions that are better suited to adversarial training [Zhang
et al., 2019, Ding et al., 2020, Wang et al., 2020]. While this line of work is orthogonal to our
approach (i.e., we do not alter the loss function of the network), we still provide comparisons to
TRADES [Zhang et al., 2019] which claims to improve on AT.
Curriculum learning and adversarial training. In curriculum adversarial training (CAT18) [Cai
et al., 2018], the authors create a curriculum by slowly increasing the number of PGD steps during
training. But their empirical results suggest that the curriculum alone is not effective and must be
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combined with other techniques such as quantization and batch mixing. Later, Wang et al. [2019]
(Dynamic AT) defined the convergence score, motivated by the Frank-Wolfe optimality gap, as a
metric to imitate a curriculum. Two recent works, Balaji et al. [2019] (IAAT) and Cheng et al. [2020]
(CAT20), use an adaptive and sample-specific perturbation norm during training. Their motivation
is that not all samples should be at a fixed distance from the decision boundary as encouraged by
AT. Instead, margins should be flexible and data-dependent. In fact, this effect is a by-product of our
scheme which perturbs naturally easier samples more than harder ones (see Section 5.1)2. Concurrent
to our work, Zhang et al. [2020] proposed a formulation of an upper bound of the adversarial loss
and, similarly to ours, used early stopping as a realization. However, their criterion is based on the
number of PGD steps, while ours relies on a concrete difficulty metric.
3 Adversarial Training with Early Stopping
3.1 Curriculum Learning and Difficulty Metric
It has been both empirically and theoretically (for a linear regression model) established that pre-
senting easy samples, based on some difficulty metric, at the beginning of curriculum-based training
improves the early convergence rate as well as the final generalization performance, especially when
the task is difficult (e.g., under-parameterized network, heavy regularization) [Bengio et al., 2009,
Weinshall and Cohen, 2018, Hacohen and Weinshall, 2019]. However, defining an effective difficulty
metric together with the ability to adjust the difficulty level of the input samples are key challenges
that need to be addressed to benefit from curriculum learning.
The adversarial setting is particularly well-suited to curriculum learning because it addresses these
issues. It provides not only several intuitive choices for difficulty metrics but also a natural control
over their difficulty level by allowing the perturbation of input samples. We start by proposing a
formulation of the curriculum-augmented adversarial loss, or curriculum loss which unifies the prior
works on curriculum-inspired adversarial training (see Table 4 in Appendix C). We introduce a given
difficulty metric ψ : Rd → R as an additional constraint on the adversarial loss.
Lcl(x, λ) = max
δ:‖δ‖∞≤
L(x+ δ) (3)
s.t. ψ(x+ δ) ≤ λ
This extra constraint is named curriculum constraint. The curriculum loss in Eqn. (3) depends on a
difficulty parameter λ which can be adjusted or scheduled as the training progresses. Without the
curriculum constraint, the curriculum loss reduces to the normal adversarial loss in Eqn. (1).
Next, we propose softmax probability gap—difference between the true class probability and the
largest softmax probability excluding the true class—as the difficulty metric for our scheme. Formally,
the probability gap g : Rd → R is defined as:
g(x) := max
j 6=y
f(x)j − f(x)y (4)
where y ∈ {1, ..., c} is the ground-truth label of x, and f : Rd → Rc is the softmax output of a neural
network. Interestingly, this metric is also implicitly used in IAAT and CAT20. Their curriculum is
generated by controlling an adaptive sample-specific perturbation norm, ∗(x), defined as the smallest
norm such that the perturbed sample is on the decision boundary (i.e. g(x+ δ) is fixed at zero). Our
scheme allows more flexibility by introducing λ and also achieves a similar effect without having to
approximate ∗(x) for each individual sample (see Section 5.1).
The probability gap as a difficulty metric also has an intuitive interpretation. A perturbed input with a
large gap, close to 1, means that it has been incorrectly classified with high confidence by the network.
This directly suggests that it is a “hard” sample for the network. On the other hand, if the gap is close
to −1, the input must be “easy” since the network has classified it correctly with high confidence.
When the gap is zero, the input is right on the boundary. Hence, by initially restricting the gap to a
small λ, we can make the curriculum loss smaller or easier to minimize early on in the training. In
the context of AT, there are two special values of λ that are of particular interest. First, for λ = 0, the
input is perturbed to be on the decision boundary, which makes it the “weakest” adversarial example.
2Naturally easy samples can be thought of as clean inputs that a given network classifies correctly with high
confidence. In other words, easy samples are on the correct side of the decision boundary and are far from it.
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Figure 1: Comparison between the perturbed
samples generated by AT and ATES. The blue
and red arrows represents PGD updates. For
ATES, the process stops when the curriculum
constraint is violated (blue cross). As λ in-
creases, ATES approaches AT.
Algorithm 1: ATES
Input :Training set (X,Y )
Parameters :PGD steps K, step size η, difficulty
scores {λt}Tt=1
for t = 1,. . . ,T do
Sample {(xi, yi)}Bi=1 from (X,Y ).
Initialize all δi’s at random.
for k = 1,. . . ,K do
maski = 1 {g(xi) ≤ λt}
if
∑B
i=1maski = 0 then
continue
end
δi ← Π(xi + η∇L(xi))− xi
xi ← xi +maski ∗ δi
end
Compute L(xi) and weights θt.
end
Second, when λ = 1, the constraint always holds for any x and δ. Thus, the curriculum loss reduces
to the worst case adversarial loss. The curriculum loss is also a lower bound of the adversarial loss
for any λ with equality for λ ≥ 1.
∀λ, Lcl(x, λ) ≤ Ladv(x) and ∀λ ≥ 1, Lcl(x, λ) = Ladv(x)
With the above interpretation in mind, we create a curriculum for AT by progressively increasing
λ from 0 to 1 during the training (illustrated in Fig. 1). We expose the model to a weak adversary,
or equivalently an easy objective, in the early stage of the training. Later, the curriculum objective,
increasing in difficulty, eventually becomes the true objective or the adversarial loss in this case.
3.2 Early Stopping
The curriculum constraint in Eqn. (3) with our difficulty metric makes the optimization problem hard
to solve since it is not a convex set of δ. Here, we modify it into a manageable form and prove the
following proposition for a binary-class case.
Proposition 3.2. In a binary-class problem, an optimum of the curriculum loss with the softmax
probability gap as the curriculum constraint can be found by a projected gradient method that
terminates when the curriculum constraint is violated.
For space considerations, we only provide an intuitive sketch of the proof below. The complete proof
is provided in Appendix B.1. We rewrite the curriculum loss in Eqn. (3) into the following simpler
form:
Lcl(x, λ) = max
δ:‖δ‖∞≤
min{L(x+ δ),− log ((1− λ)/2)} (5)
The second term inside the piecewise minimization in Eqn. (5) is a constant. So this modified problem
can be solved with PGD, similarly to the adversarial loss, and terminated as soon as the first term is
larger than the second—which is equivalent to the curriculum constraint being violated.
The curriculum loss is slightly more complicated for the multi-class case, but we propose to solve it
approximately using the same early termination as a heuristic. Hence, we call this scheme adversarial
training with early stopping (ATES)3. Algorithm 1 summarizes the implementation of our scheme.
Note that this choice is similar to Wang et al. [2019]; While their curriculum constraint is motivated
by an optimality gap, ours is explained by the network’s confidence and loss.
It is also worth noting that this curriculum incurs no additional computation during training. Fur-
thermore, as shown later in Section 5.1, it correlates with the other difficulty metrics namely the
perturbation norm, the convergence score from Dynamic AT, and the “ideal difficulty metric” corre-
sponding to an optimal hypothesis [Weinshall and Cohen, 2018].
3Note that this early stopping is applied to the adversarial example generation with PGD which is independent
of the early stopping during network training
4 EXPERIMENTS 5
Defense  = 0.3  = 0.45
No Attack Best Attack No Attack Best Attack
AT 0.9799 0.8867 0.1122 0.1122
TRADES 0.9898 0.9179 0.9736 0.0090
CAT18 0.9905 0.9083 0.9823 0.0000
Dynamic AT 0.9893 0.9317 0.9798 0.8025
CAT20 0.9946 0.1643 0.9939 0.0154
ATES (Ours) 0.9916 0.9267 0.9787 0.8056
Table 1: (MNIST) Accuracy of the defenses with and without the attack.
4 Experiments
4.1 Setup
In this section, we test the robustness of all models on three image datasets, namely MNIST, CIFAR-
10, and CIFAR-100. For MNIST, we use a three-layer convolution neural network trained for 70
epochs with 40-step PGD and step size of 0.02. For CIFAR-10/CIFAR-100, we experiment with both
the pre-activation ResNet-20 [He et al., 2016] and WideResNet-34-10 [Zagoruyko and Komodakis,
2016] where the networks are trained for 100 epochs using 10-step PGD with  = 8/255 and step
size of 2/255. PGD uses a random restart.
For evaluation, we use 20-step and 100-step PGD with five random restarts. However, adversarial
robustness evaluation has been shown to be tricky due to the gradient masking problem [Athalye et al.,
2018]. Thus, we strengthened our evaluation by including the Brendel & Bethge attack (BB) [Brendel
et al., 2019] which claims to be reliable in the face of obfuscated gradients. We only report the best
of the three attacks for each model.
We experiment with two types of schedules for λ, namely steps and linear, and report only the better
one. We found that in practice, it is beneficial to let the network train with λ = 0 for some epochs at
the beginning and also with λ = 1 towards the end. For the step schedule, λ is increased in steps of
0.333, thrice. For the linear schedule, λ is increased linearly after some epochs. The performance
of the model is generally insensitive to the schedule choices but can still be affected. For instance,
ramping up the values of λ very quickly (i.e., the curriculum loss approaches the adversarial loss
early on) may improve the robustness slightly, but it usually comes at the cost of clean accuracy.
We used open-source code to train the CAT18 and the Dynamic AT models. AT and TRADES
were re-implemented using their original code as reference. For CAT20, we obtained the code
and the WideResNet weights for CIFAR-10 directly from the authors. We used the recommended
hyperparameters whenever available. Otherwise, we experimented with a few choices and picked the
best one. Detailed descriptions can be found in Appendix A.
4.2 Results
In this section, we first compare our scheme to the other defenses, including AT, TRADES, and three
curriculum-inspired schemes, in term of both robustness and accuracy. Next, we explain how ATES
successfully avoids trivial solutions where AT fails. Finally, we highlight an improvement due to our
scheme on the robustness-accuracy trade-off and higher performance gains at larger perturbations.
Comparing clean and adversarial accuracies of various defenses. On MNIST (shown in Table 1),
with  of 0.3, both the clean and the adversarial accuracies, fall in the same range, for all defenses
except for CAT20. However, with  of 0.45, the difference is significant. Apart from ATES and
Dynamic AT, none of the other defenses are robust, with around 10% accuracy or lower. The clean
and the adversarial accuracies of AT are the same since it outputs the same logits for every input. We
elaborate on this phenomenon below.
On CIFAR-10 (shown in Table 2) and CIFAR-100 (shown in Table 3), our scheme is more robust
than all other defenses on both ResNet an WideResNet. The only exception is ResNet on CIFAR-100
where AT is only slightly more robust (25.90% vs. 25.36%) but has much lower clean accuracy than
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Defense ResNet WideResNet
No Attack Best Attack No Attack Best Attack
AT 0.8094 0.4278 0.8618 0.5150
TRADES 0.8000 0.4514 0.8808 0.4728
CAT18 0.8492 0.2312 0.8945 0.4184
Dynamic AT 0.8183 0.4616 0.8672 0.4863
CAT20 0.8646 0.3303 0.8961 0.4613
ATES (ours) 0.8399 0.4770 0.8684 0.5318
Table 2: (CIFAR-10) Accuracy of the defenses on ResNet and WideResNet against adversarial
examples with  of 8/255.
Defense ResNet WideResNet
No Attack Best Attack No Attack Best Attack
AT 0.5176 0.2590 0.6077 0.2645
TRADES 0.5715 0.2007 0.5855 0.2586
CAT18 0.5386 0.0974 0.6605 0.1091
Dynamic AT 0.5465 0.2468 0.5471 0.2341
CAT20 0.4929 0.1804 0.6284 0.2435
ATES (ours) 0.5790 0.2536 0.6295 0.2656
Table 3: (CIFAR-100) Accuracy of the defenses on ResNet and WideResNet against adversarial
examples with  of 8/255.
ours (51.76% vs. 57.90%). In terms of the clean accuracy, CAT18 and CAT20 generally outperform
the other models, but they are also the least robust. It is important to note that ATES outperforms AT
in terms of both clean and adversarial accuracies in almost every setting.
WideResNet has higher clean accuracy and robustness compared to ResNet trained with the same
algorithm. This relationship, where models with higher capacity tend to perform better than smaller
ones was first observed by Madry et al. [2017]. Our ATES as well as the other defenses also share
this property. We note that on most settings, AT is a very strong baseline. It has roughly the same
performance as TRADES and outperforms the other curriculum-based schemes in many experiments.
This may seem surprising, but it is also observed by Rice et al. [2020] that when the training is stopped
early to prevent overfitting, AT and TRADES have similar performance. Here, we perhaps observe a
similar effect on other schemes as well. To have a fair comparison, we apply the same procedure
to all of our experiments where only the most robust model tested on the hold-out validation set is
saved.
ATES avoids trivial solutions. AT with an `∞-norm perturbation usually fails when  is larger than
a certain value. After a few iterations, the training gets stuck in a trivial solution where the model
becomes a constant function and outputs the same logits for every input (red line in Fig. 3). Changing
the optimizer, the learning rate, or the random seed can sometimes mitigate the problem, but we
found that no combination of these changes allowed AT to work on MNIST with  ≥ 0.35.
One potential solution is to put the curriculum constraint on either  or the number of PGD steps, and
gradually increase their value as the epochs progressed. However, we found that this method still
could not avoid the trivial solution. The training progressed normally early on, but once either  or
the number of PGD steps increased past a certain threshold, the network collapsed to the same trivial
solution. Detailed experiments are included in Appendix E.1.
If ATES and Dynamic AT were left out of Table 1, we may have been falsely led to believe that AT
has found the most robust model possible, given the data distribution and the hypothesis space. If the
perturbation norm is large enough such that the norm balls centered at each sample are overlapping
with ones from another class, then a constant function is an optimum of the robustness problem.
However, we do not believe that this is the case for  = 0.35 on MNIST. This is because pixels in
MNIST digits mostly take values very close to 0 and 1, the limiting perturbation norm of 0.35 is still
lower than the expected robustness of near 0.5. Hence, we hypothesize that this trivial solution is
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Figure 2: (CIFAR-10) The trade-off curve of
ATES lies entirely above that of AT. Each point
represents a ResNet model trained with either
ATES or AT at  of 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 out of 255
from left to right.
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Figure 4: (CIFAR-10) Accuracy vs.  for ResNet trained with AT and ATES. The numbers in the
parentheses and the gray dashed line denote  at which the networks are trained.
an artifact of AT rather than a natural limitation of the dataset or the model. The existence of our
defense and Dynamic AT proves this hypothesis.
Apart from AT, the other schemes do not converge to the same trivial solution. TRADES, CAT18,
and CAT20 are, however, not robust to adversarial examples at  = 0.45. Since, TRADES does
not directly maximize the adversarial loss, and CAT18 and CAT20 start the training off on benign
samples, they do not suffer from the same issue as AT. Nonetheless, as training progresses, there is
no guarantee that these schemes will generate adversarial examples of similar strength or difficulty as
ones generated by AT. Hence, they fail to achieve high robustness at the desired . The curriculum
losses of ATES and Dynamic AT, however, converge to the true adversarial loss by design, explaining
their success on MNIST.
Gradient obfuscation. Our results for CAT18 and CAT20 (in Table 2) appear much lower than
reported in their respective papers. This is because both the schemes have obfuscated gradients which
were detected in our experiments. Since CAT18 uses quantization during inference time, running
PGD with multiple random restarts increased the success rate of the attack significantly. Surprisingly,
we found that BPDA was not helpful in this case [Athalye et al., 2018].
For CAT20, the problem was more subtle. It retained high accuracies on clean samples, noisy samples,
PGD attack, and transfer attack—which are all part of a recommended checklist for detecting gradient
obfuscation [Athalye et al., 2018]. Only BB attack managed to circumvent the issue and decreased
the accuracy by a large margin. For the other defenses, however, BB attack performed about the same
as the 100-step PGD attack.
Robustness-accuracy trade-off. Fig. 2 demonstrates a clear benefit of using ATES over AT in
term of both robustness and clean accuracy. Typically, improvement in terms of one metric comes
at the cost of the other, lending credence to the hypothesis on the accuracy and robustness trade-
off [Tsipras et al., 2019, Su et al., 2018]. However, here we show that ATES can reach a point above
the accuracy-robustness trade-off curve of AT with a significant gap.
Bigger improvement with larger perturbation. The benefit of our scheme increases as  gets larger.
Fig. 4 demonstrates this effect on ResNet trained with AT and ATES at  = 12/255, 16/255, and
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Figure 5: (CIFAR-10) Plots an average of (a) perturbation norm, (b) convergence score, and (c) ideal
difficulty scores vs. epochs for AT and ATES.
24/255 on CIFAR-10. ATES models always improve clean accuracy by a large margin (6%, 9%, and
13% for the three choices of  respectively) and also simultaneously increases the robustness against
adversarial examples with perturbation norm below the specified . In fact, this agrees with the
observation made by Bengio et al. [2009] and Weinshall and Cohen [2018] that curriculum learning
contributes more when the task is more difficult. A larger perturbation norm means a stronger
adversary and a higher adversarial loss, representing a harder task.
5 Discussion
5.1 ATES Forms a Curriculum Based on Other Difficulty Scores
In Fig. 5, we show that ATES creates a curriculum according to three other difficulty metrics suggested
by prior works, namely the perturbation norm, the convergence score [Wang et al., 2019] (lower
means more difficult), and the ideal difficulty score [Weinshall and Cohen, 2018]. The difficulty as
measured by these scores increases (or decreases for the convergence score) gradually as training
progresses. Conversely, AT only follows a curriculum based on the ideal difficulty score. Fig. 5a
confirms that our scheme implicitly uses an adaptive and sample-specific perturbation norm that
motivates IAAT and CAT20. In addition to the empirical result, we prove a theoretical result on the
ideal difficulty score on logistic regression:
Proposition 5.1. Using ATES on logistic regression problem with a non-decreasing λ forms a
curriculum according to the ideal difficulty metric under two mild assumptions.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.2. One of the two assumptions stating that the perturbation
norm increases as training progresses is also supported by Fig. 5a.
5.2 Robustness-Accuracy Trade-off with Difficulty Parameter (λ)
The maximum value of λ can be used as a parameter to control the trade-off between clean and
adversarial accuracy. As mentioned, small λmax < 1 indicates an easy curriculum which should corre-
spond to high clean accuracy and low adversarial accuracy. Our experiment confirms this observation.
On CIFAR-10, setting λmax = 0 achieves clean accuracy of 87.37% and adversarial accuracy of
41.57% compared to 83.99% and 47.70% when λmax = 1. ATES with other values of λmax ∈ (0, 1)
also interpolates between ATES with λmax = 0 and with λmax = 1 (see Appendix E.3).
5.3 Faster Training and FGSM Adversarial Training
In practice, ATES is only negligibly faster than AT because samples are processed in batch. Conse-
quently, computation is saved only when all samples stop early, which is unlikely for a batch size
of 128. Nonetheless, we experiment with single-step FGSM which is recently claimed to provide a
similar level of robustness to PGD while using only a fraction of time [Wong et al., 2020].
Here, we propose a simple extension of ATES that is compatible with FGSM. Since FGSM-AT
essentially makes an assumption that the loss is linear, we can make use of the same assumption to
calculate the “shortened” distance ˆ:
ˆ = min
{
,
max{λ− g(x), 0}
‖∇g(x)‖1
}
(6)
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The full derivation is included in Appendix F. On ResNet trained on CIFAR-10, FGSM-AT has clean
accuracy of 79.25% and robust accuracy of 44.92% at  of 8/255. FGSM-ATES achieves a modest
improvement with 81.13% and 45.02% for clean and robust accuracy respectively. This suggests that
our scheme is compatible with and can improve FGSM training. We leave this direction for future
work.
6 Conclusion
We propose ATES, a robust training algorithm, that achieves high clean accuracy and avoids getting
stuck in trivial solutions which are the problems of the original AT. Our scheme is based on the general
formulation of curriculum loss we propose combined with an intuitive choice of difficulty metric.
With extensive evaluations, ATES outperforms AT, TRADES, as well as the other curriculum-inspired
defenses on both clean and adversarial accuracies in most of the settings.
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A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTS 11
We provide below detailed explanations, comparative empirical results, and theoretical analysis of
our proposed approach. We begin with description of the experiments (datasets, model architecture,
training parameters, and algorithm-specific parameters) in Section A. Theoretical results on (i) Choice
of Early Stopping for optimizing the curriculum loss (in Proposition 3.2); and (ii) ATES on logistic
regression forms a curriculum under ideal difficulty metric (in Proposition 5.1) are presented in
Section B. A detailed exposition of how our formulation generalizes prior curriculum constraints is
provided in Section C. This is followed by Section D, which provides rigorous empirical evidence
supporting that ATES forms a curriculum based on other proposed difficulty metrics (perturbation
norm, convergence score, and ideal difficulty score). More experimental results evaluating various
aspects of ATES and the impact of ATES on model training and robustness, under varying diffi-
culty parameter values is summarized in Section E. Lastly, we finish with the formulation and the
preliminary results on FGSM adversarial training using ATES (Section F).
A Detailed Description of the Experiments
The neural networks we experiment with all use ReLU as the activation function and are trained
using SGD with a momentum of 0.9 and batch size of 128. We use early stopping during training
(not related to ATES), i.e., we evaluate the models at the end of each epoch and only save the one
with the highest adversarial validation accuracy thus far. Dataset-specific details of the training as
well as brief descriptions of the model architectures are provided below.
MNIST. All experiments use the same three-layer convolution network (8x8-filter with 64 channels,
6x6-filter with 128 channels, and 5x5-filter with 128 channels respectively) with one fully-connected
layer. Models are trained for 70 epochs with a batch size of 128. The initial learning rate is set at 0.01
and is decreased by a factor of 10 at epochs 40, 50, and 60. We use weight decay of 5×10−4. During
training, we run PGD for 40 steps with a step size of 0.02 and use a uniform random initialization
within the `∞-ball of radius .
CIFAR-10/CIFAR-100. We use both pre-activation ResNet-20 [He et al., 2016] and WideResNet-
34-10 [Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016], which are trained for 100 epochs with a batch size of 128.
We use 10-step PGD with step size of 2/255 and random restart. The initial learning rate is set at
0.1 and is decreased by a factor of 10 at epochs 40, 60, and 80. Weight decay is set to 5× 10−4 for
CIFAR-10 and 2× 10−4 for CIFAR-100. Standard data augmentation (random crop, flip, scaling,
and brightness jitter) is also used.
For TRADES, we did a grid search on the values of β including β = 6, which is the value suggested
in the original paper for MNIST and CIFAR-10. However, we did not find any value of β that resulted
in a robust model at  = 0.45 on MNIST, so we only report results for β = 6 in the table. For
CIFAR-10, we report results with β = 10, as it yields higher robustness close to AT and ATES. We
attempted the same procedure to find β that could yield comparable robustness to that of AT and
ATES on CIFAR-100, since the original paper does not experiment with this dataset. However, no
value of β (we searched up to 400) reaches that level of robustness, and the improvement diminishes
as β becomes very large.
For Dynamic AT, we followed the schedule used in the original paper, i.e., the convergence score is
initialized at 0.5 and is reduced to zero in 80 epochs for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. For MNIST, we
found that the accuracy improved slightly when the convergence score reached zero earlier, so we
reduced the number of epochs over which the decay occurred from 80 to 30. For CAT18 and CAT20,
we used the original code and only experimented with the recommended default hyperparameters4.
For ATES, we used slightly different schedules for the difficulty parameter λ depending on the setting
(Fig. 6). For MNIST, we only used a step schedule wherein we increased λ is steps of 0.3333 at
epochs 30, 45, and 60. On ResNet (both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100), we used a similar step schedule,
i.e., λ is increased at epochs 40, 60, and 80. On WideResNet, we found that it is beneficial to increase
λ in earlier epochs. So we increased λ at epochs 30, 40, and 50 instead. In addition to the step
schedules, we also tried a linear schedule wherein we started increasing λ at epoch 30 and continued
to do so until it reached one at epoch 70 for both ResNet and WideResNet models.
4The code for CAT18 is publicly available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/
curriculum-adversarial-training-CAT, and the code for CAT20 is provided by the authors.
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Figure 6: Plots of multiple schedules of the difficulty parameter λ used in ATES. (a), (b), and (c)
display the step schedule for MNIST model, ResNet, and WideResNet respectively. (c) shows the
linear schedule used by both ResNet and WideResNet.
All of the codes are written in PyTorch and run on servers with multiple Nvidia 1080ti and 1080
GPUs. On a single Nvidia 1080ti GPU with 12 cores of Intel i7-6850K CPU (3.60GHz) and 64 GB
of memory, ATES with an MNIST model takes 2 hours to train, ResNet takes about 6 hours, and
WideResNet uses about 24 hours. During training, we only saved the weight of the most robust model
based on a hold-out validation set which is randomly chosen from 10% of the training samples for
CIFAR-10/100 or is separately given for MNIST. We use the default parameters for BB attack.
B Theoretical Results
B.1 Early Stopping
Here, we first restate and prove Proposition 3.2 for the binary-class case. Then, we extend it to our
heuristic for the multi-class case.
Proposition 3.2. In a binary-class problem, an optimum of the curriculum loss with the softmax
probability gap as the curriculum constraint can be found by a projected gradient method that
terminates as soon as the curriculum constraint is violated.
Proof. First, we rewrite the curriculum objective such that it includes the normal loss function.
g(x+ δ) ≤ λ ⇐⇒ max
j 6=y
f(x+ δ)j − f(x+ δ)y ≤ λ
⇐⇒ 1− f(x+ δ)y − f(x+ δ)y ≤ λ
⇐⇒ f(x+ δ)y ≥ (1− λ)/2
⇐⇒ − log (f(x+ δ)y) ≤ − log ((1− λ)/2)
⇐⇒ L(x+ δ) ≤ γ := − log ((1− λ)/2)
Now we can rewrite the optimization in Eqn. (3) as
max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
L(x+ δ) = max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
L(x+ δ)
s.t. g(x+ δ) ≤ λ s.t. L(x+ δ) ≤ γ
= max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
min {L(x+ δ), γ}
Now we have arrived at the modified optimization problem that only has one convex constraint on
the norm of δ. This problem can then be solved with PGD (we call it PGD, but it is a projected
gradient ascent). Given a particular sample (x, y), let’s consider two possible cases. First, @δ such
that ‖δ‖∞ ≤  and L(x+ δ) ≥ γ. In this case, the new problem reduces to the adversarial loss whose
local optima can be found by PGD with a sufficient number of iterations.
The second scenario, ∃δ such that ‖δ‖∞ ≤  and L(x+ δ) ≥ γ, can be solved if we can find any δ
that satisfy the two conditions. Since projected gradient methods satisfy the first condition by default,
we only have to run PGD until the second condition is satisfied. Equivalently, PGD can be terminated
as soon as the curriculum constraint is violated.
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Figure 7: Adversarial example generated at iteration t, x˜t, is further from the ideal boundary and
hence, has lower loss than x˜t+1.
For the multi-class case, γ is dependent on δ so Eqn. (3) does not reduce to a similar simple form.
g(x+ δ) ≤ λ ⇐⇒ max
j 6=y
f(x+ δ)j − f(x+ δ)y ≤ λ
⇐⇒ f(x+ δ)y ≥ max
j 6=y
f(x+ δ)j − λ
⇐⇒ − log (f(x+ δ)y) ≤ − log
(
max
j 6=y
f(x+ δ)j − λ
)
⇐⇒ L(x+ δ) ≤ γ(x+ δ, λ) := − log
(
max
j 6=y
f(x+ δ)j − λ
)
Note that we can assume that the RHS on line 2, maxj 6=y f(x + δ)j − λ, is positive. Otherwise,
the constraint is automatically satisfied and can be ignored because the LHS f(x + δ)y is always
non-negative. Similarly to the binary-class case, Eqn. (3) can be rewritten as:
max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
L(x+ δ) = max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
L(x+ δ)
s.t. g(x+ δ) ≤ λ s.t. L(x+ δ) ≤ γ(x+ δ, λ)
= max
δ:‖δ‖p≤
min {L(x+ δ), γ(x+ δ, λ)}
This objective is difficult to optimized in a few steps of PGD because of the piecewise min and max as
well as the fact that the two terms are inversely proportional to the other. Alternatively, we propose a
heuristic to approximate the objective by treating the second term as a constant and so not computing
its gradients (we still update it as δ changes).
B.2 Logistic Regression
In this section, we prove the following theoretical result on a linear classifier.
Proposition 5.1. Using ATES on logistic regression problem with a non-decreasing λ forms a
curriculum according to the ideal difficulty metric under two mild assumptions.
The other way to interpret this proposition is that the sequence of the perturbed training inputs
generated by ATES has an increasing ideal difficulty score whenever the two assumptions hold. If the
two assumptions hold throughout the training process of the logistic regression, then Proposition 5.1
holds as stated.
First, we outline the intuition and the sketch of the proof. We define pair (x, y) as a sample x and
its ground truth label y which takes value 0 or 1. Denote the logistic classifier with f : Rd → R
parameterized by weight w ∈ Rd. To prove the proposition, we want to show that an adversarial
example generated at iteration t of the training (x˜t) incurs a smaller loss with respect to an optimal
hypothesis w∗ compared to one generated at iteration t+ 1 (x˜t+1) or subsequent iterations. In other
words, since all x˜’s are correctly classified by the optimal hypothesis, we want to show that x˜t is
further away from w∗ than x˜t+1 for all t.
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For simplicity, consider the case where λ is fixed at zero. Fig. 7 illustrates adversarial examples (x˜t
and x˜t+1) generated via ATES with λ = 0. Note, as λ = 0, x˜ is right on the boundary. At iteration t
of the training, the boundary defined by the weight wt is “far” from the optimal boundary w∗. Hence,
x˜t is also far from w∗. Once the weight is updated to wt+1 which is closer to w∗ compared to wt
(Assumption 1), x˜t+1 also gets closer to w∗ compared to x˜t.
We now formally define the logistic classifier and logistic loss L. We ignore the bias term as it can
always be subsumed by w.
f(x;w) := σ(〈w, x〉) := 1
1 + e−〈w,x〉
L(x;w) := −y log(f(x;w))− (1− y) log(1− f(x;w))
w∗ := arg min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
δ:‖δ‖≤
L(xi + δ;w)
For now, we assume that the ground truth label of x is 1. The proof for label 0 is analogous, and
requires only a few modifications. For any given λt, x˜t is the nearest point to x on the hyperplane
characterized by {z ∈ Rd | g(z;wt) = λt}. We first rewrite an equivalent condition to g(z;wt) = λt
as a linear function of z.
g(z;wt) = λt
1− f(z;wt)− f(z;wt) = λt (Use definition of g(z))
1
1 + exp(−〈wt, z〉) =
1− λt
2
exp(−〈wt, z〉) = 1 + λ
t
1− λt (λ
t < 1)
〈wt, z〉 = − log
(
1 + λt
1− λt
)
:= αt
Hence, {z ∈ Rd | g(z;wt) = λt} = {z ∈ Rd | 〈wt, z〉 = αt}. Note that αt is zero when λt is also
zero and decreases as λt increases. Now we can write x˜t in a closed form derived by Melachrinoudis
[1997]:
x˜tj = xj +
|〈wt, x〉 − αt|
‖wt‖1
· sgn
(
−〈wt, x〉
wtj
)
= xj +
〈wt, x〉 − αt
‖wt‖1
· sgn (−wtj)
where we use the fact that x is correctly classified, i.e. 〈wt, x〉 > 0, and that αt ≤ 0. Note that the
perturbation norm is clipped by a maximum value of .
x˜tj = xj + min
{
,
〈wt, x〉 − αt
‖wt‖1
}
· sgn (−wtj) (7)
We are now ready to state the two assumptions.
Assumption 1. 0 ≥∑dj=1 sgn (−wtj)w∗j ≥∑dj=1 sgn (−wt+1j )w∗j
Assumption 2. 〈w
t,x〉−αt
‖wt‖1 ≤
〈wt+1,x〉−αt+1
‖wt+1‖1
In Assumption 1, note that
∑d
j=1 sgn
(−wtj)w∗j takes its largest value ‖w∗‖1 when signs of wt are
completely opposite to signs of w∗, i.e. ∀j = 1, ..., d, sgn (wtj) = −sgn (w∗j ). When the signs
are completely aligned, it takes the smallest value −‖w∗‖1. If wt “aligns” well with w∗, the first
inequality is likely true, and if any subsequent update put wt+1 even closer to w∗, the second
inequality also likely holds.
Loosely speaking, the second assumption states that samples are perturbed more to reach the stopping
hyperplane in subsequent training iterations. Intuitively, this makes sense because of two reasons.
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Schemes Curriculum Constraints Implemented Methods
Perturbation norm ‖δ‖∞ ≤ λ Projection: ‖δ‖∞ ≤ λ
CAT18 [Cai et al., 2018] n/a Setting PGD steps
Dynamic AT [Wang et al., 2019] 〈δ,∇L(x+ δ)〉 −  ‖∇L(x+ δ)‖1 ≤ λ Early stopping
IAAT [Balaji et al., 2019] g(x+ δ) ≤ 0 Projection: ‖δ‖∞ ≤ ∗(x)
CAT20 [Cheng et al., 2020] g(x+ δ) ≤ 0 Projection: ‖δ‖∞ ≤ ∗(x)
ATES (Ours) g(x+ δ) ≤ λ Early stopping
Table 4: Comparison of constraints and implementations of different curriculum-based AT schemes
unified under the form of Eqn. (3). Note that CAT18 uses the number of PGD steps as the constraint
which cannot be written analytically.
First, the model should become more robust as the weights are being updated, and hence, this
increases the distance to the boundary, i.e. 〈w
t,x〉
‖wt‖1 ≤
〈wt+1,x〉
‖wt+1‖1 . Second, in ATES, α
t ≥ αt+1 since
λt ≤ λt+1. This assumption is also empirically supported by Fig 5a on the neural network.
Now that we have obtained all the tools and assumptions needed, we are ready to get into the proof.
Proof. As mentioned, Proposition 5.1 can be translated into the following statement: x˜t incurs a
smaller loss with respect to an optimal hypothesis w∗ compared to x˜t+1. Formally, we can write this
statement as follows:
L(x˜t;w∗) ≤ L(x˜t+1;w∗)
The case where x is already misclassified is trivial as it will not be perturbed and so L(x˜t;w∗) =
L(x˜t+1;w∗) = L(x;w∗). Now we only consider the case where x is correctly classified at iteration
t. We start with the closed form of x˜t from Eqn. (7) in a vector form.
x˜t = x+ min
{
,
〈wt, x〉 − αt
‖wt‖1
· sgn (−wt)}
〈w∗, x˜t〉 = 〈w∗, x〉+ min
, 〈wt, x〉 − αt‖wt‖1
 d∑
j=1
sgn
(−wtj)w∗j

≥ 〈w∗, x〉+ min
, 〈wt, x〉 − αt‖wt‖1
 d∑
j=1
sgn
(−wt+1j )w∗j
 (Assumption 1)
≥ 〈w∗, x〉+ min
, 〈wt+1, x〉 − αt+1‖wt+1‖1
 d∑
j=1
sgn
(−wt+1j )w∗j
 (Assumption 2)
= 〈w∗, x˜t+1〉
⇒ f(x˜t;w∗) ≥ f(x˜t+1;w∗)
⇒ L(x˜t;w∗) ≤ L(x˜t+1;w∗)
This concludes the proof.
C Choices of Curriculum Constraints from Prior Works
Our formulation of the curriculum loss and in particular, the curriculum constraint generalize the
curriculum learning approach used by the prior works. Table 4 lists the different curriculum constraints
used by each approach together with their method of choice to satisfy the corresponding constraints.
CAT18 controls the difficulty by setting the number of PGD steps for generating adversarial examples.
Dynamic AT terminates PGD early once the convergence score is lower than the specified value.
Note that the quantity presented in Table 4 (third row) is a negative convergence score.
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Figure 8: The perturbation norm of the adversarial examples generated by ATES. In addition to mean
(blue) and median (red), we also plot the perturbation norm of 20 random samples (other colors).
The maximum perturbation norm is also an intuitive difficulty metric that can be scheduled manually
or can be automatically adjusted based on some condition. Both IAAT and CAT20 explicitly use
the sample-specific perturbation norm, ∗(x), to control the difficulty. In addition, both methods
approximate and schedule ∗(x) based on the true curriculum constraint (which is designed to keep
the perturbed sample on the decision boundary and not push it further inside the boundary of an
incorrect class, g(x+ δ) ≤ 0).
Initially, ∗(x) is set to a small value. If the perturbed sample is correctly classified, then the value of
∗(x) is increased in order to increase the difficulty for the next epoch. Alternately, if the perturbed
sample is incorrectly classified, ∗(x) is decreased for IAAT or left unchanged for CAT20. If this
approximation works well, then ∗(x) should be close to the shortest distance from the decision
boundary for each training sample. We now restate our observation from (Section 4), that the choice
of g(x+ δ) ≤ 0 is what potentially causes CAT20 to have high accuracy but low robustness. The
other difference between IAAT and CAT20 is that CAT20 also uses label smoothing which could be
the cause of the gradient obfuscation that we observed in our experiments.
D Correlations with Other Difficulty Metrics.
In this section, we further argue as well as provide additional empirical results in support of the
observation that ATES also forms a curriculum based on three other difficulty scores (Section 5.1).
D.1 Perturbation Norm
We claimed that ATES implicitly and adaptively increased the effective perturbation norm as training
progressed. Intuitively, the perturbation norm increases for two reasons. First, when the difficulty
parameter is increased, the curriculum constraint is relaxed and thus, the samples can be perturbed
more on average before the constraint is violated or before PGD is terminated. Second, as the network
becomes more robust, a larger perturbation is required to generate adversarial examples with the
same level of difficulty. We empirically verify this statement by training networks using ATES on
CIFAR-10 with  = 16/255 and tracking the mean and median of the perturbation norm for 1, 000
randomly chosen training samples (Fig. 8).
Furthermore, we wanted to validate if the perturbation norm continued to increase with training
epochs, even when the difficulty parameter λ was fixed at a particular value (i.e., we set λmax = 0). If
it did, then this relationship can attributed to fact that higher the robustness of the network (as training
progresses), larger the perturbation needed to produce adversarial examples with the same difficulty
level, as mentioned above. As expected, the perturbation norm increased at a faster rate for ATES
with λmax = 1 (Fig. 8b) compared to ATES with λmax = 0 (Fig. 8c), but regardless of the rate, the
correlation between perturbation norm and the training epochs is clearly observable. Notice that with
λmax = 1, ATES uses the maximum perturbation norm available, just like AT, while generating the
adversarial examples. This is because the curriculum loss converges to AT when λ approaches one.
Alternately, when λ is fixed at zero, most of the training samples are not perturbed with the maximum
perturbation norm, and so the network never sees the worst-case adversarial examples corresponding
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Figure 9: The mean convergence scores [Wang et al., 2019] of the adversarial examples generated
from 1,000 randomly chosen training samples by AT (red) and ATES (blue).
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Figure 10: The mean ideal difficulty scores [Weinshall and Cohen, 2018] of the adversarial examples
generated from 1,000 randomly chosen training samples by AT (red) and ATES (blue). O-AT and
O-ATES denote oracles trained with AT and ATES respectively.
to these training samples. This also explains why ATES with λmax < 1 has lower robustness but
higher clean accuracy. We discuss this trade-off in more detail in Appendix E.3.
Note that the increase in the perturbation norm is not linear. The complex relationship between the
perturbation norm and the training epochs as well as the observed fluctuations, possibly explain why
naively increasing  as a linear or step function of epochs does not work as well as our method (see
Appendix E.1).
D.2 Convergence Score
The convergence score was proposed as a metric to quantify the strength of an adversary or how well
the inner maximization was solved [Wang et al., 2019]. To improve AT, the authors suggested that a
high convergence score be maintained at the beginning of the training and then decreased gradually
as training progressed. They empirically demonstrated that this form of curriculum increased the
convergence quality of the adversarial examples in the later epochs, and training on these samples
improved the final robustness.
The convergence score measures the the Frank-Wolfe gap of the inner maximization which is zero
when it is solved completely. It is defined as follows:
c(x+ δ) =  ‖∇xL(x+ δ; θ)‖1 − 〈δ,∇xL(x+ δ; θ)〉 (8)
Fig. 9 compares the progression of the convergence score between AT and ATES on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 (note the log scale). Note, the mean convergence score of ATES starts at the highest point
and goes down consistently, however, for AT, the score is initially very small. It then shoots up
sharply and only decreases gradually as training progresses. This plot indicates that unlike AT, ATES
generates a curriculum with increasing difficulty when measured based on their convergence scores.
Hence, ATES enjoys the same advantages of Dynamic AT.
D.3 Ideal Difficulty Score
Given an input, the ideal difficulty score is defined as the loss with respect to the optimal hypothe-
sis [Weinshall and Cohen, 2018], or in our case, L(x; θ∗), where θ∗ is the solution to Eqn. (2). We
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Figure 11: Experiments with two naive difficulty metrics ( and the number of PGD steps) and two
schedules (linear and step). The right axis (orange) of every plot shows values of the corresponding
metric at each epoch. The top row shows the train adversarial accuracy (red), the validation adversarial
(blue) and clean (green) accuracy. The bottom row shows gradient norms with respect to weights at
every iteration or minibatch.
do not use this difficulty metric to guide the network we are training because of the lack of a good
proxy for the optimal hypothesis. However, in this subsection, we show how an approximation of the
ideal difficulty score would change during the training of AT and ATES according to some proxy
hypotheses or oracles. To provide a less biased result, we picked two fully trained models as oracles,
one trained with AT (O-AT) and the other trained with ATES (O-ATES). The oracles use a different
architecture and random seed from the AT and ATES models we want to test.
Fig. 10 shows the average loss computed on each of the oracles, treated as a proxy to the ideal
difficulty score. On MNIST, the scores from AT vary in a wide range and do not exhibit clear trends.
Conversely, for ATES, the training samples start off with a low score, and their score consistently
increases throughout the training, indicating a steady increase in difficulty level. On CIFAR-10,
however, the scores on AT also increase with the epochs similarly to ATES.
E More Experimental Results
E.1 Avoiding Trivial Solutions
Before settling on the softmax probability gap, we experimented with a number of simple and intuitive
choices for difficulty metrics to avoid the trivial solutions on MNIST. Two such simple metrics to
control the strength of an adversary are: (i) , and (ii) the number of PGD steps, such that smaller
the value of the metric weaker the adversary and vice versa. To increase the difficulty level of the
adversarial examples, we increased the value of these metrics until they reached the desired final
values (e.g., for MNIST, these values are  = 0.45 with 40 PGD steps). Note, scheduling the number
of PGD steps to generate a curriculum is part of CAT18 which also combines it with the other
additional techniques (quantization and batch mixing).
We attempted to control these metrics using two different schedules: (i) linear (increase the metric
linearly with epoch until plateau at epoch 40), and (ii) steps (increase the metric in steps at epoch
20 and 40). When one metric is varied, the other is kept fixed at the final desired value (i.e., when
we schedule , the number of PGD steps is fixed at 40, throughout training). Fig. 11 shows various
accuracy curves (train adversarial accuracy, validation adversarial accuracy, and clean accuracy) of
models trained using a combination of the two metrics under the two schedules. All models get stuck
and admit a trivial solution after a certain number of epochs as their corresponding metric exceeds
some thresholds. This demonstrates that the two naive metrics are insufficient for controlling the
difficulty of adversarial examples.
Controlling Gradient Norms: Furthermore, corresponding to the epoch where the models abruptly
turns into a constant function (both clean and adversarial accuracy drop to around 10%), the gradient
norm with respect to the weights (Fig. 11: bottom row) also shoots up for at least about an order of
magnitude. This leads us to suspect that the extremely large gradient update leads the model towards
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Figure 12: Comparison of accuracy (left) and gradient norm (right) during training of AT (red) and
ATES (blue) on MNIST with  = 0.3.
Defense  = 0.3  = 0.45
No Attack 20-PGD 100-PGD BB No Attack 20-PGD 100-PGD BB
AT 0.9799 0.8904 0.8867 0.8987 0.1122 0.1122 0.1122 0.1122
TRADES 0.9898 0.9196 0.9179 0.9219 0.9736 0.1113 0.1099 0.0090
CAT18 0.9905 0.9127 0.9083 0.9580 0.9823 0.0000 0.0000 0.9823
Dynamic AT 0.9893 0.9336 0.9317 0.9361 0.9798 0.8388 0.8025 0.8595
CAT20 0.9946 0.1643 0.1732 0.8910 0.9939 0.0154 0.0180 0.8883
ATES (Ours) 0.9916 0.9308 0.9267 0.9336 0.9787 0.8333 0.8056 0.8380
Table 5: (MNIST) Accuracy of the defenses under all three attacks.
a trivial solution. Finally, gradient norm can be controlled directly via the loss which can in-turn be
controlled by the softmax probability—motivating our difficult metric.
To show that ATES does affects gradient norms, we train two models also on MNIST with  = 0.3
using AT and ATES. Fig. 12 partially confirms our intuition. On one hand, ATES helps avoid large
jumps in gradient norm and also decreases the overall norm. On the other hand, the AT model starts
off slow and seems to get stuck in a local minima. However, after around 20 epochs, the AT model
escapes the local minima as the gradient norm jumps up significantly together with the accuracy.
E.2 Results from All Three Attacks
In this subsection, we compile the clean and the adversarial accuracies on all three datasets, MNIST
(Table 5), CIFAR-10 (Table 6), and CIFAR-100 (Table 7), under the three attacks namely 20-PGD,
100-PGD, and BB attacks. The bold numbers are the largest number in each column excluding the
red ones which indicate the numbers that do not accurately reflects the true robustness. For instance,
BB attack performs poorly on CAT18 for two reasons. First, we use the implementation from
Foolbox [Rauber et al., 2017] which does not support quantization. Second, BB attack minimizes the
perturbation norm, and quantization will naturally remove most of the perturbation. The other case,
already mentioned in Section 4, is the gradient masking on CAT20 where the PGD attacks do not
perform well. The result for CAT20 on MNIST appears to be an outlier (PGD attacks perform well
but not the BB attack).
E.3 Varying Difficulty Parameters on ATES
In addition to the accuracy-robustness trade-off we presented in Section 4, ATES also allows an
additional parameter that controls the difficulty of the curriculum loss in a more fine-grained manner,
namely the difficulty parameter λ. We have argued that λ should be set to one towards the end of the
training (λmax = 1) to guarantee that the network is exposed to the worst-case adversary. However,
if we prefer less robustness and higher accuracy, it is entirely possible to schedule λ such that it only
reaches λmax with other values smaller than one.
F FGSM ADVERSARIAL TRAINING WITH ATES 20
Defense ResNet WideResNet
No Attack 20-PGD 100-PGD BB No Attack 20-PGD 100-PGD BB
AT 0.8094 0.4290 0.4278 0.4416 0.8618 0.5329 0.5150 0.5351
TRADES 0.8000 0.4530 0.4514 0.4572 0.8808 0.4728 0.4797 0.4935
CAT18 0.8492 0.2312 0.2369 0.7736 0.8945 0.4184 0.6170 0.8930
Dynamic AT 0.8183 0.4626 0.4616 0.4729 0.8672 0.4876 0.4863 0.4998
CAT20 0.8646 0.6289 0.6396 0.3303 0.8961 0.6985 0.7167 0.4613
ATES (Ours) 0.8399 0.4892 0.4770 0.4892 0.8684 0.5506 0.5318 0.5474
Table 6: (CIFAR-10) Accuracy of the defenses under all three attacks.
Defense ResNet WideResNet
No Attack 20-PGD 100-PGD BB No Attack 20-PGD 100-PGD BB
AT 0.5176 0.2604 0.2601 0.2590 0.6077 0.2763 0.2645 0.2814
TRADES 0.5715 0.2222 0.2007 0.2181 0.5855 0.2589 0.2586 0.2641
CAT18 0.5386 0.1182 0.0974 0.4580 0.6605 0.1926 0.2563 0.6499
Dynamic AT 0.5465 0.2476 0.2468 0.2538 0.5471 0.2344 0.2341 0.2386
CAT20 0.4929 0.2620 0.2617 0.1804 0.6284 0.4236 0.4203 0.2435
ATES (Ours) 0.5790 0.2540 0.2536 0.2687 0.6295 0.2805 0.2656 0.2841
Table 7: (CIFAR-100) Accuracy of the defenses under all three attacks.
Fig. 13 demonstrates that λmax provides an additional way to adjust the trade-off. The plot includes
λmax of 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 1 while skipping 0.5 to 0.9 as they perform approximately the same
as λmax = 1. As expected, the clean accuracy dips down as λmax increases in order to gain on the
adversarial accuracy.
We also took a step further in this direction and tried to combine the two parameters, maximum
perturbation norm and λmax for adjusting the trade-off. Specifically, on CIFAR-10, we fix λmax = 0
and increase the maximum perturbation norm to 16/255 to compensate for the loss of robustness.
Fig. 14 compares the adversarial accuracies of ResNets trained using AT, ATES with λmax = 1,
ATES with λmax = 0, and ATES with λmax = 0 and  = 16/255. Training with a larger  of
16/255 does increase the robustness compared to both ATES with λmax = 0 and AT under all the
attacks with  ≥ 0.02. It also has a similar clean accuracy to ATES with λmax = 1 but still performs
worse under the attack with  = 8/255. While this result shows that it is possible to compensate one
trade-off parameter with the other, it also becomes harder to find the right parameters.
F FGSM Adversarial Training with ATES
Training neural networks with adversarial examples generated by the single-step FGSM (FGSM-
AT) [Goodfellow et al., 2015] was previously known to be unsuccessful in improving model ro-
bustness. Only recently, Wong et al. [2020] fixed some of the issues with FGSM-AT and used it to
train neural networks to attain almost the same level of robustness as that obtained using AT [Madry
et al., 2017], while using only a fraction of the computational power. Here, we describe one of many
ways for applying ATES to the FGSM training. The FGSM formulation for generating adversarial
examples is as follows:
xfgsm = x+  · sgn (∇L(x))
FGSM as a method for finding adversarial examples is motivated by an assumption that neural
networks exhibit linear behavior in high-dimensional spaces [Goodfellow et al., 2015]. For linear
classifiers, FGSM finds optimal adversarial examples, and if the loss function is also linear then an
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Figure 13: (CIFAR-10) Accuracy vs. robustness trade-off on ATES with varying difficulty parameter
λ. From left to right, each point corresponds to a ResNet model trained with λmax taking values of 0,
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 1 respectively. We skip over λmax = 0.5, ..., 0.9 because they perform similar
to λmax = 1.
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Figure 14: (CIFAR-10) Accuracy comparison between different versions of ATES. The numbers
in parentheses on the legends indicate the maximum perturbation norm at which the networks are
trained on.
increase in the loss due to FGSM perturbation δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤  is given by
∆L = max
δ:‖δ‖∞≤
〈δ,∇L(x)〉
= ‖δ‖∞ · ‖∇L(x)‖1 (dual norm)
=  · ‖∇L(x)‖1
Now, for ATES, we can replace the loss function by the softmax probability gap g(x) and make a
similar assumption that it is linear in x. Under this assumption, we can compute an exact perturbation
norm ˆ such that, analogous to the above derivation, the curriculum constraint is binding (g(x+ δ) =
λ), i.e.,
∆g = ˆ · ‖∇g(x)‖1
g(x+ δ)− g(x) = ˆ · ‖∇g(x)‖1
λ− g(x) = ˆ · ‖∇g(x)‖1
ˆ =
λ− g(x)
‖∇g(x)‖1
.
Note that a sample is not perturbed if the curriculum constraint is already violated and that there is
also a constraint on the maximum perturbation norm. By combining these two restrictions, we end up
with the following formulation as written in Eqn. (6):
ˆ = min
{
,
max{λ− g(x), 0}
‖∇g(x)‖1
}
At this point, we can replace  in FGSM-AT with ˆ. We call this scheme FGSM-ATES. The difficulty
parameter λ is again increased as training progresses, but the ramp-up must be faster than that in
PGD training since FGSM training uses fewer epochs.
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Defense No Attack 20-PGD 100-PGD BB
AT 0.7925 0.4764 0.4492 0.4621
ATES (Ours) 0.8113 0.4593 0.4502 0.4674
Table 8: (CIFAR-10) Accuracy of FGSM-AT and FGSM-ATES under all three attacks.
For evaluation, we used the setting described in Wong et al. [2020] (barring the mixed-precision
arithmetic). However, we could not reproduce a similar result as reported in Wong et al. [2020] when
using only 15 epochs. Instead, we trained the networks with FGSM-AT and FGSM-ATES for 30
epochs, and λ is increased by 0.3333 at epoch 5, 10, and 15. We report their accuracy under the
three attacks in Table 8. FGSM-ATES has a higher clean accuracy but a similar adversarial accuracy
compared to FGSM-AT, suggesting that it may have an advantage over FGSM-AT. More importantly,
it establishes that ATES is indeed compatible with FGSM training. For future work, we hope to
experiment with other formulations of FGSM-ATES and match its performance with that of the
multi-step ATES or the normal ATES with PGD.
